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Abstract—A Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET) is a cooperative
engagement of a collection of mobile nodes without any cen-
tralized access point. The underlying concept of coordination
among nodes in a cooperative MANET has induced in them a
vulnerability to attacks due to issues like dynamically changing
network topology, cooperative algorithms and lack of central-
ized monitoring point. We propose a semi-distributed approach
towards a reputation-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that
combines with the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol for
strengthening the defense of a MANET. Our system inherits the
features of reputation from human behavior, hence making the
IDS socially inspired. It has a semi-distributed architecture as the
critical observations of the system are neither spread globally nor
restricted locally. The system assigns maximum priority to self
observation by nodes for updating any reputation parameters,
thus avoiding the need of a trust relationship between nodes. Our
system is also unique in the sense that it features the concepts of
Redemption and Fading with a robust Path Manager and Monitor
system. Simulation studies show that DSR fortified with our
system outperforms normal DSR in terms of the packet delivery
ratio and routing overhead even when up to half of nodes in
the network behave as malicious. Various parameters introduced
such as timing window size, reputation update values, congestion
parameter and other thresholds have been optimized over several
simulation runs. By combining the semi-distributed architecture
and other design essentials like path manager, monitor module,
redemption and fading concepts, our system proves to be robust
enough to counter most common attacks in MANETs.
Keywords: Adhoc networking, Security, promiscuous mode, Rep-
utation based Intrusion Detection System
I. INTRODUCTION
The term adhoc networks dates back to the 1970’s where
an adhoc network was first setup as a part of certain defense
research projects. With advances in microelectronics technol-
ogy and networking protocols, it has been possible to integrate
mobile nodes and various other network devices into a single
unit called an adhoc node. Further, interconnection of these
nodes wirelessly is termed as an adhoc network.
MANETs are different from conventional networks. A MANET
is formed by an autonomous system of mobile nodes that
are self-configuring and have no constraints, such as a fixed
infrastructure or a central administration system. Nodes in
MANETs are both routers and terminals. They are dynamic in
the sense that each node is free to join and leave the network in
a nondeterministic way. In addition, they do not have a clearly
defined physical boundary, and therefore, no specific entry or
exit point. Such a network can thus be rapidly deployed and
can provide the amount of flexibility and adaptability which is
otherwise unattainable under adverse circumstances. Although
MANET is a very promising technology, challenges are slowing
its development and deployment. Nodes in adhoc networks are
in general limited in battery power, memory and CPU capacity.
Hence the transmission ranges of these devices are also limited
and nodes have to rely on neighbor nodes in the network
to route the packet to its destination. They are sometimes
referred to as multihop networks, where a hop is a direct link
between two nodes. Adhoc networks have found applications
in emergency rescues, battlefield operations, mobile conferenc-
ing, national crisis, home and community networking, disaster
recovery etc.
The flexible structure and volatile environment of MANETs
results in significant node misbehavior. Not only does it
degrade the overall network performance, but, it also becomes
difficult to detect intruders on grounds of mobility and vulner-
ability of the nodes. Thus, there is a serious need for a robust
IDS for MANETs.
Some fundamental problems of MANETs must be kept in
mind while designing any security solution. Firstly, it is often
very hard to differentiate intrusions and normal operations or
conditions in MANETs because of the dynamically changing
topology and volatile physical environment. Secondly, mobile
nodes are autonomous units that are capable of roaming
independently in an unrestricted geographical topology. This
means that nodes with inadequate physical protection can be
captured, compromised or hijacked. Thirdly, decision-making
in adhoc networks is usually decentralized and many adhoc
network algorithms rely on the cooperative participation of
all nodes. Most adhoc routing protocols are also cooperative
in nature and hence can be easily misguided by false routing
information. Without any counter policy, the effects of mis-
behavior have been shown to dramatically decrease network
performance. In this paper, we propose a new technique based
on reputation for efficiently solving the problem of intrusion
detection.
The next section gives a brief background about routing
related issues in MANETs, section III entails a discussion of
some related efforts which is followed by the system design
overview in section IV. Section V describes the protocol and
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the following section VI talks about its implementation details.
Simulation results and optimization procedures for parameters
such as window size are given in the section VII. The last
section presents some concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the nature of attacks on MANETs, we
first need to look at the routing protocols for these networks.
They have been classified under two main categories -
Proactive and Reactive routing protocols. Proactive protocols
work with tables that are used to store routing information
and updates are triggered to propagate any information
about changes throughout the whole network. The obvious
advantage is that routes to any destination node are always
available without the overhead of generating a route request
whenever the need for a route arises. But, an extra overhead
is always a major issue before deploying a proactive routing
protocol, because it generally affects the overall throughput
and power usage. Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector
(DSDV) [1], Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP) [2], Cluster
Gateway Switch Routing (CGSR) [3] are some common
examples.
On the other hand, Reactive routing protocols are on-demand
i.e. a route discovery mechanism is initiated whenever
there is a need for setting up a path for communication
between a source and a destination node. The source node
initiates route discovery by flooding the network successively
with route queries. The destination node on receiving a
route request (RREQ) addressed to it, sends back a route
reply (RREP) message as unicast to the source node either
through the discovered route or by initiating another route
request. Generally, on-demand routing requires less overhead
than table-driven routing; but it incurs a path discovery
delay whenever a new path is needed. Dynamic Source
Routing protocol (DSR) [4], Adhoc On-Demand Distance
Vector Routing (AODV) protocol [5], Temporally Ordered
Routing Algorithm (TORA) [6], Associativity-Based Routing
(ABR) [7], Signal Stability Routing (SSR) [8], Zone-Based
Hierarchical Link State Routing Protocol (ZRP) [9] are a few
examples.
Attacks are possible on reactive protocols like DSR due
to lack of built-in security measures and the assumption of
honest coordination and cooperation among nodes and with
the protocol. We will outline a few attacks by nodes below,
the others are discussed in detail by Sonja Buchegger et. al.
[10]:
• Dropping all packets not destined to it or performing
only partial dropping. Partial dropping can be restricted to
specific types, such as only data packets or route control
packets or packets destined to specific nodes.
• Sending forged routing packets, an attacker can create
a so-called black hole, a node where all packets are
discarded or all packets are lost.
• Modifying the nodes list in the header of a RREQ or a
RREP to misroute packets and adding incorrect routes in
the route cache of other nodes.
• Decreasing the hop count DSR(TTL) when receiving a
packet, so that the packet will never be received by the
destination. This attack could be detected by the previous
node in route by enhanced passive acknowledgment.
• Initiating frequent RREQ to consume bandwidth and en-
ergy and to cause congestion.
III. RELATED WORK
Reputation-based systems are a new paradigm and are being
used for enhancing security in different areas. These systems
are lightweight, easy to use and are capable of facing a
wide variety of attacks. Among these mechanisms, CORE [11],
CONFIDANT [12] and OCEAN [13] gain a special mention.
Reputation based systems do not rely on the conventional
use of a common secret to establish confidential and secure
communication between two parties. Instead, they are simply
based on each other’s observations. Reputation based systems
are used for enhancing security in adhoc networks as they
model cooperation between the nodes which is inspired from
social behavior. Such systems are used to decide whom to
trust and to encourage trustworthy behavior. Resnick and
Zeckhauser [14] identify three goals for reputation systems:
• To provide information to distinguish between a trustwor-
thy principal and an untrustworthy principal.
• To encourage principals to act in a trustworthy manner
• To discourage untrustworthy principals from participating
in the service the reputation mechanism is present to
protect.
Watchdog and Path-rater [10] are some essential components
of any typical reputation based IDS. Watchdog performs the
activity of monitoring its neighborhood and based on these
observations, pathrater ranks the available path in route cache.
Misbehavior detection and reputation-based intrusion detection
may be either distributed or local. Here, fully distributed means
that information regarding one’s reputation change is immedi-
ately propagated in the whole network. In the latter case, called
local reputation based systems, nodes are fully dependent
on their personal opinion about other nodes’ reputation and
behavior.
Distributed IDS protocols rely only on first-hand information
with optional second-hand information. CORE [11] proposed
by P. Michiardi and CONFIDANT [12] proposed by Buchegger
and Le Boudec fall into this category. Some basic problems
with this approach of global reputation systems are:
• Every node has to maintain O(n) reputation information
where n is number of nodes in network.
• Extra traffic generation in reputation exchange.
• Extra computation in accepting indirect reputation infor-
mation (secondhand information) esp. Bayesian Estima-
tion.
• Security issues in reputation exchange such as reputation
data packets can be modified.
CONFIDANT detects misbehaving nodes by means of observa-
tion or by ALARM signals from neighborhood. It aggressively
informs nodes in neighborhood about misbehavior of the
malicious node. The weightage of ALARM warning signal
depends upon the level of trust of receiving node about the
sending node. In addition, it uses bayesian estimation for
various measures and calculation of trust and reputation and
thus, the IDS becomes complex. CONFIDANT is vulnerable to
false accusations if trusted nodes lie or if several liars collude
[15].
CORE [11] proposed by P. Michiardi et. al. uses a mechanism
to enforce node cooperation in MANETs. In this mechanism,
reputation is a measure of someone’s contribution to network
operations. Members that have a good reputation can use
available resources while members with a bad reputation
cannot, because they refused to cooperate earlier and are
gradually excluded from the community. CORE defines three
types of reputation:
• Subjective reputation is a reputation value which is lo-
cally calculated based on direct observation.
• Indirect reputation is second hand reputation information
which is established by other nodes.
• Functional reputation is related to a certain function,
where each function is given a weight as to its im-
portance. For example, data packet forwarding may be
deemed to be more important than forwarding packets
with route information, so data packet forwarding will
be given greater weight in the reputation calculations.
CORE reputation values range from positive (+1), through
null (0), to negative (-1). CORE suffers from the problem of
unwanted consequence of good reputation, where a good node
may even wish to decrease its reputation by behaving badly to
prevent its resources being over-used. The CORE mechanism
assumes that every node will use the same reputation calcu-
lations and will also assign the same weights to the same
functions. This is a potentially inappropriate assumption in
heterogeneous adhoc networks, where devices with different
capabilities and roles are likely to place different levels of
importance on different functions depending upon CPU usage,
battery usage etc. One can take advantage of this situation
and may perform only those functions which have higher
preferences in calculating reputation.
The second type of IDS may be categorized as local systems.
They solely depend upon the first hand observation of their
neighbors for reputation maintenance. OCEAN [13] by Bansal
and Baker falls into this category. In these systems, nodes
make routing decisions based only on direct observations
of their neighbor nodes. This eliminates most of the trust
manager complexity, but, doesn’t fit well to a highly mobile
adhoc network. In such a network, it may be difficult for
the reputation upgrading process to cope up with the node
mobility and it might not be appropriate to depend solely upon
personal observation. Also, using secondhand information can
significantly accelerate the detection and subsequent isolation
of malicious nodes in MANETs [16].
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
As stated earlier [17], the system design is based on the
reputation paradigm and possesses a semi-distributed nature
in terms of the reputation exchange mechanism.
The term semi-distributed is used in the system observation
context, which is neither restricted to the observing node nor
immediately propagated to the whole network as is the case
in true distributed systems. The system design has been kept
simple keeping in mind the amount of traffic already in the
network and constraints such as the critical amount of battery
and computational power that individual nodes possess. The
system runs on every node in the network and consists of the
following modules:
A. Monitor
In wireless networks, acknowledgements are often provided
at no cost, either as an existing standard part of the MAC
protocol in use (such as the link-layer acknowledgement frame
defined by IEEE 802.11) or by a “passive acknowledgement”
(in which, a node confirms receipt at another node by over-
hearing the transmission from sender). The Monitor holds
the responsibility of monitoring activities in the neighborhood
using PACKs (Passive ACKnowledgements) which have been
provided as a feature in the DSR protocol specifications [4] as
promiscuous mode.
Every node registers all the data packets sent by it to its
next hop neighbor and on overhearing packets in promiscuous
mode, it matches those against packets registered in the queue.
These packets are considered as PACKs only if both of the
following two tests succeed:
• The source address, destination address, protocol, identi-
fication and fragment offset fields in the IP header of the
two packets must match, and
• If either packet contains a DSR source route header, both
packets must contain one and the value in the ‘segments
left’ field in the DSR source route header of the new
packet must be less than that in the first packet.
A crucial new parameter introduced in our system is the
timing window that is a fixed time interval. After each timing
window, nodes make a log of number of packets for which
they have not received acknowledgment in the form of PACK
and communicate this information to the reputation system.
In existing reputation systems, every packet is kept waiting
for its PACK for a fixed time interval. In contrast, we use
the concept of timing window, which gives us the flexibility
of checking timeout on fixed intervals rather than checking
it on the basis of each individual packet’s timeout. Monitor
maintains a log of activity of next neighbor for each window
and sends it to the reputation manager. Depending upon its
cooperation, performance and current environment conditions,
reputation system updates the nodes’ reputation. With the help
of Timing Window, the system also takes into consideration
congestion state of nodes, which shall be explained in next
subsection.
B. Reputation System
Reputation system module assigns and maintains reputation
of different nodes as a numeric value with a lower limit of 0
and upper limit equal to the value of MaliciousThreshold.
Reputation of any node can change by three means, as shown
in Figure 1:
Fig. 1. The System Behavior
• By Self observation
• WARNING Message, issued by neighboring nodes
• Avoid List, appended to the RREQ/RREP header
All three means of reputation change have some associated
reputation weights with them, giving maximum weightage to
self observation. The reputation is updated after every timing
window and the information is communicated in a sporadic
way by means of avoid lists thereby avoiding much of network
overhead. The concept of avoid list is inherited from OCEAN
[13]. It facilitates easy communication among nodes by putting
their malicious node list in the RREQ header. This helps in
reducing the extra network traffic which would otherwise
be generated while communicating this information among
the peers. A node may be tagged as normal, suspicious or
malicious depending on the reputation value associated with
it. Every new node starts with a normal reputation value of
zero and this reputation value may be lowered by degrading
its performance or it may be incremented through the positive
appraisal feature on normal behavior. To add to the robustness
and performance of our system, it is ensured that absolute
value of the negative decrement awarded is larger than the
positive appraisal. However at no point should the reputation
of node go above zero to prevent the kind of attacks, where
a node first gains positive reputation but later on depicts
a malicious behavior, thereby bringing its reputation value
back to the normal range. It also avoids the peculiar situation
where a node may end up exhausting all its crucial resources
in routing extra traffic faced due to the popularity gained
by earning positive reputation. After each timing window,
reputation system receives activity log of next hop neighbor
from monitor with number of packets for which it has not
received PACK, which are classified as missing or dropped
packets. The number of missing packets is then compared
with the MaliciousDropThreshold and if it is comparatively
lesser, then the reputation manager gives positive performance
appraisal otherwise a negative one. Unlike existing systems
our system does not have a rigid MaliciousDropThreshold,
we introduce the concept of congestion parameter, which is
given as:
Congestion Parameter =
Current queue length
Total queue length
(1)
With the assumption that the next node is also in same
congestion state as the node in contention. Misbehavior drop
threshold, that is the allowed number of packet drops in a
timing window is dynamically decided as:
MaliciousDropThreshold = MaxPacketRate× CongestionParameter×WindowSize
(2)
Whenever a new node is categorized as malicious, a warn-
ing message is spread only to its immediate neighborhood,
thus protecting the network flooding with reputation update
messages. This can be understood from the Figure 2:
Fig. 2. A typical network scenario
If Node B categorizes A as malicious, a Warning Message
is spread to all immediate neighbor nodes: C, D and E (not
to F). Nodes C, D and E on receiving a warning message
decrease the reputation of node A, against which the message
was originally published. Lastly, another mode of reputation
updating is by means of an avoid list [16]. During the route
discovery phase the RREQ sending node puts its malicious
node list in RREQ packet header and initiates discovery.
When a node receives a route request packet it decreases the
reputation of all those nodes quoted in the avoid list by a
predefined weight. The node also appends its own malicious
node list in the header and then forwards the route request
packet.
In order to deal with the attacks on a typical reputation system,
like those of ‘Collusion of liars’ and ‘false warning messages’,
the system has a policy that nodes can be categorized mali-
cious only by self-observation. It helps in nullifying attacks
of the aforementioned types as the false warning messages
spread by nodes can only decrease reputation of the victim
nodes to a certain extent, termed as suspicious threshold. Once
this threshold is reached, the system solely depends upon self
observation for making the final decision. Warning messages
and avoid list are only effective above the suspicious threshold.
Whenever a node’s reputation is in the suspicious category and
a deciding node receives a new warning message or an avoid
list appearance for the previous one, the system performs a
knock test. Knock test is a unique test designed for checking
the authenticity of a node against whom the deciding node
constantly receives such information. For instance, if node A
falls into the suspicious category and node B receives another
warning message or an avoid list appearance corresponding to
node A, the deciding node B performs a knock test over A,
explained later in the protocol description section.
C. Path Manager
The path manager performs trivial path management func-
tions in collaboration with DSR core. Path ranking is done
according to path priority formula (3). Updating path-cache on
various events such as those when new nodes are declared as
malicious or a malicious node is taken back in network; taking
decision on receiving route request or traffic from malicious
nodes are a few responsibilities of the path manager. Concept
of avoid list has been added to path manager, which is a list of
malicious nodes that a certain node possesses and is appended
to the RREQ header whenever a route request is issued by some
node. Nodes which find themselves in avoid list do not process
the packet and may simply drop it. During RREP, only a path
with clean nodes is preferred over those containing suspicious
nodes and malicious nodes. Replies from such nodes are also
dropped and nodes do not process request and/or forward data
packets from such nodes. If during traffic flow, a new node
is declared malicious, then, all paths containing it are deleted
from route cache and a route error is generated, stating that
their link to the destination node has been broken. Neighbors,
after receiving a route error, clear the activity log of the node
which generates a route error from the current timing window.
The following function may be used to decide the path priority
if need arises:
Path Priority ∝ 1|Min reputation of Node in path|×no of hops (3)
D. Redemption And Fading
Redemption and Fading are introduced in our design to
allow nodes previously considered malicious to become a
part of the network again. MANETs run on cooperation and
collaboration of peer nodes and no one gets benefited without
cooperating with each other. Knock test is crucial for nodes in
suspicious category and node may fail this test due to various
reasons like transient link failures, congestion or resetting of
the network interface etc. and once they fail this test, they
are declared as malicious. To account for these problems, our
system uses the fading mechanism. After a certain inactivity
period the reputation of a node is improved by a certain
predefined fading rate and finally the node is moved from
the malicious list to middle of suspicious category. But, the
node is not given neutral rating [18] so that if the node again
misbehaves then it is immediately put in malicious list and all
transactions through that node are blocked. Here, inactivity
period means no appearance in any WARNING messages or
avoid list.
V. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
This section entails a discussion of the actual working of the
system and provides the flow for various activities at different
types of nodes. Following algorithms give a concise idea of
the route discovery phase, monitoring mode and knock test
feature of our system as discussed in earlier sections.
SENDER
1: ⇒ Generate RREQ Packet
2: ⇒ Pack Malicious List in RREQ Header as Avoid List
3: ⇒ Propagate Request
OTHER NODES
4: if (Own name present in Avoid List) then
5: ⇒ Drop Request
6: else
7: ⇒ Scan Avoid List
8: ⇒ Update Node’s Reputation
9: ⇒ Append its own malicious list to RREQ header
avoiding repetition
10: if (Node is same as Destination in RREQ) then
11: ⇒ Prepare Reply
12: else
13: ⇒ Add itself in route and propagate
14: end if
15: end if
The above algorithm presents a node’s behavior during route
establishment phase. Sender of the RREQ just initiates the route
discovery process with avoid list of malicious nodes packed in
the RREQ packet header. The remaining nodes after receiving
such requests process the avoid list attached in the received
RREQ header. If a matching entry is found for their own name
in the list, the node drops the request. Otherwise, the reputation
of the other nodes present in the avoid list is updated. If the
receiving node is the destination for which the RREQ has been
sent, then it prepares a route reply else it appends its own
malicious list in the header to the existing avoid list avoiding
repetitions and propagates the route request.
MONITOR MODE
Self Observation-
1: if (Performance is below normalThreshold) then
2: ⇒ Negative reputation update
3: else
4: ⇒ Positive reputation update
5: if (reputation is above 0) then
6: ⇒ SET reputation = 0
7: end if
8: end if
WARNING MESSAGE PROPAGATION
9: if (WARNING MSG && NEIGHBOR) then
10: if (Reputation below Suspicious Threshold) then
11: ⇒ Perform Knock Test
12: if (Knock Test is Passed) then
13: ⇒ Assign normal reputation
14: else
15: ⇒ declare as Malicious
16: ⇒ spread Warning Message
17: end if
18: end if
19: else
20: ⇒ decrease reputation
21: end if
The system in monitoring mode has three ways of gathering
information for reputation updation:
• Self Observation
• Warning Message
• Avoid List
Some observations just monitor the neighbor with the help of
PACK. If the performance lies below the suspicious threshold,
then a negative reputation update is performed over the node in
consideration, otherwise a positive appraisal is given. Warn-
ing messages are only processed if they are for immediate
neighbors. If the reputation of a node under consideration
is below the suspicious threshold, then the knock test is
performed. Otherwise, the reputation is decreased linearly.
Table 2 contains actual values of these constant parameters
used during system simulation.
KNOCK TEST
1: ⇒ Identify target Node
2: ⇒ Generate fake data packet with route via target node
3: ⇒ Send packet to target node and wait for its PACK
4: if (PACK is found) then
5: ⇒ test Passed
6: ⇒ Set reputation to default
7: else
8: ⇒ test Failed
9: ⇒ Declare node as malicious and broadcast Warning
message
10: end if
Knock test is designed specifically for immediate neighbors
to test whether a particular node is malicious or not and is only
performed on nodes in suspicious state. In this test a dummy
data packet with time to live (TTL) equal to 2 is sent to a
node in question via last known route through that node.
The sender node overhears traffic of the node in question
in promiscuous mode. If the node on which knock test is
being performed successfully forwards the test packet to next
hop then its reputation is set to default. In case it fails, then
it is immediately put into malicious category and a warning
message is broadcasted in the immediate neighborhood. If in
case, the dummy packet is genuinely dropped because of bad
channel conditions the node may be classified as malicious.
However, it still has an opportunity to become a part of
network again through redemption and fading mechanism,
as explained earlier. This is done because the system only
trusts first hand information for putting a node into malicious
category, thus, giving self observation the highest weightage.
The weightage assigned to warning message and avoid list
citation is comparatively less than self observation.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION/SIMULATION
This section first describes the simulation environment and
then we compare the throughput of our system in the presence
of malicious nodes against a defenseless DSR protocol. The
network simulator ns2 (version 2.29) [19] was used to run the
simulations. Mobility of nodes is characterized by a mobility
model, speed and ‘pause time’. The random waypoint model is
selected as a mobility model in a 1000 × 1000 m2 rectangular
field. Using this mobility model, each movement is a straight
line between a start and an arrival point, covered at a constant
speed which is a uniform distribution, between 0 and 10 m.s−1
for each movement. The pause time is the time period between
two consecutive movements. Thus, the higher the pause time,
lesser is the node’s mobility. We have used 5 different pause
times: 0, 100, 300, 600 and 900 seconds.
There are two setups having a total of 10 and 20 nodes,
with number of malicious nodes between 10 to 100%. We use
maximum 5 and 10 CBR (Constant Bit Rate) connections for
10 and 20 nodes respectively, sending 64 bytes packets with
a 4 pkts.s−1 sending rate. The bandwidth is 2 Mb.s−1. The
Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol used is IEEE 802.11.
The malicious nodes are of the following nature: dropping an
average of 99% of the CBR-connection packets (data packets).
The dropping decision is taken depending upon a number
generated at random. We assume that malicious nodes do not
drop the DSR routing packets like route request, route reply or
error as they always want to be part of network. A malicious
node dropping all the packets is comparatively less dangerous
for the MANET because in that case, it would drop all packets
including routing packets. Following which, they would never
be able to include themselves in any the communication routes.
The fixed parameters for the simulation are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Fixed Parameters
Parameter Level
Area 1000 m × 1000 m
Speed uniformly distributed between
0 and 10 m.s−1
Radio Range 250 m
Placement uniform
Movement random waypoint model
MAC 802.11
Sending capacity 2 Mbps
Application CBR
Packet size 64 B
Simulation time 900 s
Thus, if no route has been established containing these nodes,
they would never be able to drop any data packet sent to
them either. As a consequence, they would not affect the
throughput of whole network. For evaluating the performance
of our system, we account for the Packet Delivery Ratio and
Routing Overhead metrics. Packet delivery ratio is calculated
as the ratio of data packets received to data packets sent. For
routing overhead we have taken a ratio of number of control
packets generated (request, reply and error) to the number of
data packets sent thus, being basically a cost v/s. gain ratio.
The routing overhead ratio gives us the approximate number
of control packets for each data packet sent which should not
be significantly greater as compared with that of normal DSR.
Throughput refers to the actual measured performance of the
system when the delay is considered. In the simulation results,
the metrics of throughput are related to the average value per
node. Finally, the average delay shows the average one-way
latency observed between transmitting and receiving a packet.
Unless otherwise specified, the experiments are repeated ten
times in all cases with varying random seed. The seed in-
fluences the placement and movement of the nodes. The
radio range, sending capacity, and MAC have been chosen to
represent a typical adhoc mobile node; the speed is uniformly
distributed between 0 and 10 m/s to represent speed of user
in fixed location, walking or running. The simulation time is
chosen to be long enough to potentially roam the whole area
and is set to 900 seconds. The system was deployed and tested
with following values of constant parameters
Table 2: Values of Constant Parameters
Constant Value
Neutral Rating 0
Suspicious Threshold -35
Malicious Threshold -50
Window Size 1 second (Default)
Self Observation Weightage -5
Warning Message Weightage -2
Avoid List Appearance Weightage -1
Inactivity Timeout Period 20 seconds
Finally, CBR has been chosen for generating the traffic. The
scenario and traffic connections have been randomly generated
using the cbrgen and setdest utility from CMU’s Monarch
project [20].
VII. RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Results for Packet Delivery Ratio are shown in the Figure 3.
The system performs better than normal DSR comparing
results taken after average over 10 iterations with different
pause times. The system performance is significantly better
than normal DSR when percentage of malicious nodes is less
than 40. After which, it starts to deteriorate and significantly
falls after 70%. But, in case 70% or more nodes are malicious
we can simply discard the network as it is no longer of
significance. There is no need to establish trust relationship
and links among the nodes when 7 out of 10 are known to be
malicious.
Fig. 3. Packet Delivery Ratio Comparison
Figure 4 shows routing overhead of our system protocol
compared with normal DSR. Number of control messages in
the network are significant, as more are the number of packets,
more is the time spent in establishing routes and lesser is the
number of data packets sent. Our system performs better than
normal DSR without much extra routing overhead. This extra
routing overhead is generated because whenever a new node
is declared as malicious, a route error is generated and the
link is broadcast as broken. After which, some more time is
consumed to establish a new link. This is crucial to the IDS
performance.
Fig. 4. Routing Overhead Comparison
The Figure 5 illustrates fine tuning of the system with
respect to sliding window size. Window size is a crucial
parameter for the system because of its role in deciding the
system performance. As depicted by the figure, in most cases,
the window size 1.25 seconds scenario delivers optimal packet
delivery ratio as compared to other scenarios where window
size is of 0.50, 0.75, 1.00, 1.50 and 1.75 seconds. From the
figure, one can infer that for a small window size, the system
is too busy in various book-keeping tasks for monitoring and
reputation updating. For a larger window size, the system
response gets too slow. Hence, the time to identify malicious
nodes increases and accordingly does the number of packet
drops. Therefore, overall performance of system deteriorates
in terms of packet delivery ratio.
Fig. 5. System performance for various window sizes
The Figure 6 shows packet delivery ratio values for the
system against pause times of 0, 100, 300, 600 and 900
seconds.
Fig. 6. System performance against Pause times
In a highly mobile scenario such as one with pause time
of 0 seconds the system performance decreases as most of
the time the system has to cope up with the mobility of nodes
and tasks like updating route cache, discovering & establishing
routes etc. Likewise, in a static network scenario with pause
times of 600 and 900 seconds, where the system does not have
many choices in terms of clean routes, once these nodes get
identified, the system performance also degrades.
As depicted by the Figure 7, the performance is optimal
for a scenario with window size of 1.25 seconds in terms of
routing overhead. Although, the difference between various
scenarios presented is not very significant, but it is crucial for
system performance to optimize this value.
Fig. 7. System routing overhead for various window sizes
In addition, the system also performs optimally in terms
of the routing overhead incurred. Thus, the proposed solution
is able to strengthen the defense of DSR protocol without
incuring much of overhead.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVE
Mobile adhoc networks have a number of significant secu-
rity issues which cannot be solved alone by simple IDS. In
this paper, we have critically examined the existing systems
and outlined their strength and shortcomings. We have opted a
semi-distributed approach for our system in terms of mode of
information propagation among nodes. The goal was to design
a system incorporating the best traits of all existing systems
without incurring extra routing overhead. Congestion param-
eter, Knock test and Timing window are some new concepts
that have been introduced in this system. Detailed simulations
carried out over our system using ns2 for performance eval-
uation have contributed significantly to some crucial design
issues. Optimal values of the parameters used are obtained and
critically examined for efficient performance of the system.
However, some additional study is required for evaluating the
adequacy and importance of congestion parameter. The system
performance can also be judged by interchanging the values
of weightage assigned to self observation with that of other
reputation update modes such as warning message and avoid
list citations. It is our belief that some interesting results are
bound to come with such studies which shall justify the system
design in its current stage.
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